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XII.
The next case, in the order of time, was that of U. S. v.
Holliday, decided in 1866, and reported in 3 Wall. (7o U. S.)
407. The subject for decision was the extent of the power
to regulate commerce with the Indian Tribes, and must be
omitted here, from developing no new principles, as may be
seen from an examination of the case just alluded to, with
those of U. S. v. 43 Gallons of Whiskey (1876) 3 Otto (93
U. S.) 188, and S. C. (1883) Io8 U. S. 491; U. S. v. LeBris
(1887) 121 U. S. 278; Bates v. Clark (1877) 5 Otto (95
U. S.) 204.
XlII.
An originalfpackage is one which has been brought from
another State or Nation, and not merely one, which has fiaid
a tax to the United States.
A license granted under the taxing powers o1 the United
States does not necessarily authorize the carrying on of the
business, trade or manzfactre licensed; thereby differing
from a license under the commerce fowers.
An internal revenue license, obtained by a lottery ticket
dealer or a retail liquor dealer, does not authorize sales of
lottery tickets or liquor. The licensee has merely fiaid a tax
to the United States.
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Each State has aulhority over the business, trade and man-
ufactures of its citizens, -until its regulations conflict with the
commerce or other Constitutional ipowers of tlhe United States.
The License Tax Cases (1867), 5 Wall. (72 U. S.) 462, did
much towards defining the power of a State over the busi-
ness or trades of its citizens. The first of these cases was an
indictment of Rufus B. Vassar, in the United States Circuit
Court for the Northern District of New York, October 2o,
1863, for carrying on the business of a lottery ticket dealer
without the license required by the Act of Congress:-
CHAP. CXIX. An Act to provide Internal Revenue to support thW
Government, and to pay interest on the Public Debt. (Approved July x,
1862 ; 12 Stat. at Large 433.)
SEC. 57. And be it further enacted, That from and after the first day
of August, eighteen hundred and sixty-two, no person, association of per-
sons, or corporation, shall be engaged in, prosecute, or cary on, either of
the trades or occupations mentioned in section sixty-four of this Act, un-
til he, she, or they shall have obtained a license therefor, in the manner
hereinafter provided.
This Section was re-enacted in Section seventy-one of the
Act of June 30, 1864 (13 Stat. at Large 248), and again by
the Act .of July 13, 1866 (14 Id. 113), where the word
license was changed to sb eczal tax. This :was considered by
Chief Justice CHASE to be conclusive as to the intention of
Congress, when originally imposing this tax, of not intrud-
ing upon the strictly internal affairs of a State.
The penalty inflicted by Section fifty-nine of the Act of
1862, (12 Stat at Large 453) was three times the license; to
it was added imprisonment, by Section twenty-four of the
Act of March 3, 1863 (Id. 727); and then converted into
payment of the license, with fine or imprisonment or both,
by Section seventy-three of the Act of June 30, 1864 (13 Id.
249). This was again changed to fine, or imprisonment, or
both, by Act of July 13, 1866 (4 Id. 113), and to a fine
only by Act of March 2, 1867 (Id. 473). But there was no
immunity from punishment under State laws, in any of these
Acts.
The Act of 1862 also contained the express disclaimer of
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superior authority, in those portions printed in roman type
of-
SEc. 67. And be it further enacted, That no license hereinbefore pro-
vided for shall, if granted, be held or construed to exempt any person
carrying on the trade, business, or profession specified in said license,from
anypenalty or punishment providedby the laws of any Slate for carrying
on such trade, business, or profession, within such State, or in any -manner
authorize the commencement, or continuance of [any] such trade, busi-
ness, [occupation or employment] or profession [therein mentioned,
within any State, or Territory of the United States, in which it is, or shall
be specifically prohibited by the laws thereof, or in violation of] contrary
lo the laws of [any] such State [or Territory], or in places prohibited by
municipal law; [Provided, nothing contained in this Act shall] nor shall
.any such license be held or construed [so as] to prevent or prohibit any
State [the several States], from placing a duty or tax [or license, for
State or other purposes, on any trade, business, [matter or thing] or pro-
jession, [on] for which a [duty, tax, or] license is required [to be paid] by
this Act; nor shall any person, carrying on any trade, business or pro-
f/ession, for which a license is required by this Act be exempt from pro-
curing such license, or from any penalty or punishment herein provided,
by, or in consequence of, any State law either'authorizing or prohibiting
such trade, business or profession.
The italicised words were inserted and the bracketed words
omitted in the re-enactment of this section by the Act of
June 30, 1864 (SEc- 78, 13 Stat at Large 25o-i). These
changes are a signifi6ant Congressional exposition of the
original Act of 1862, long before the Supreme Court came
to apply the same interpretation.
Section Sixty-four of the Act of 1862 did not mention
lottery ticket dealers, who remained untaxed until the amen-
datbry Act of March 3, 1863, Sec. 37, (12 Stat. at Large 715)
which fixed one thousand dollars as the tax; which was the
amount fixed by Section seventy-nine of the Act of June
3o , 1864 (13 Id. 252). This sum was diminished to one
hundred dollars by Section nine of the Act of July 13, 1866,
(I4 Id. ix 6) and the tax was finally removed by the Act of
July 14, 1870 (x6 Id. 256). At no time was there any at-
tempt to give the tax or license an exclusive effect upon
State laws.
Section two of the Act of 1863 (12 Stat. at Large 718),
required the use of stamps on the lottery tickets; and Sec-
THE LAW GOVERNING
tions one hundred and eleven to thirteen of the Act of 1864
(13 Id. 279) required a tax upon the gross receipts and in-
flicted money penalties upon both the buyer aiid seller of
unlicensed lottery business, with this significant-
Provided, furlher, That nothing in this section [113] contained shall
be constiuedl to legalize any lottery.
There were other details respecting lotteries in the sup-
plementary Act of March 3, 1865 (13 Stat. at Large 472,
485), but no legalizing clauses.
The sending of letters and dirculars respecting lotteries
was not forbidden until the Act of July 27, I868, Section
13, (15 Stat. at Large 196,) so that no such question of ille-
gality hampered the decision of the Supreme Court.
Returning to the case under consideration, it appears that
the defendant demurred to the indictment, because the State
laws made the carrying on of his business a criminal offense,
and he therefore contended that Congress could not license
his crime. The Judges of the Circuit Court differing in
opinion, the case was certified to the Supreme Court, where
Chief Justice CHASE delivered the unanimous opinion of the
Court, adverse to the defendant because the payment of the
license would not give any rights against the State laws.
Recurring, though without naming the case, to Gbons
v. Ogden, the Chief Justice affirmed its particular principle
(ante, page 428)- 
It is not doubted that where Congress possesses Constitutional power to
regulate trade, or intercourse, it may regulate by means of licenses as
well as in other modes; and, in case of such regulation, a license will
give the licensee authority to do whatever is authorized by its terms:
(5 Vall. 72 U. S. 470).
Applying still another principle of the same case (ante,
page 435), the Chief Justice proceeded to lay down the
obvious conclusion-
But very different considerations apply to the internal commerce or do-
mestic trade of the States. Over this commerce and trade, Congress has
no power of regulation, nor any direct control. This power belongs ex- -
clusively to the States. No interference by Congress, with the business
of citizens transacted within a State is warranted by the Constitution, ex-
cept such as is strictly incidental to the exercise of powers clearly granted
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to the legislature. The power to authorize a business within a State, is
plainly repugnant to the exclusive power of the State over the same
subject.
It is true that the power of Congress to tax, is a very extensive power.
It is given in the Constitution, with only one exception and only two
qualifications. Congress cannot tax exports, and it must impose direct
taxes by the rule of apportionment, and indirect taxes by the rule of
uniformity. Thus limited, and thus only, it reaches every sulect, and
may be exercised at discretion.
But it reaches only existing subjects. Congress cannot authorize a
trade or business within a State, in order to tax it.
The granting of a license, [of this kind] therefore, must be regarded as
nothing more than a mere form of imposing a tax, and of implying noth-
ing, except that the licensee shall be subjectto no penalties under national
law, if he pays it: (5 Wall. 72 U. S. 470, 471).
Calling, attention to the careful limitations against legaliz-
ing what had been forbidden by State laws, the Chief Justice
considered that the two lines of legislation, State and Con-
.gressional, proceeded to the same result, and, therefore no
publid morality or policy could be violated in convicting the
defendant for not paying a license fee or tax for that business
which it was a crime to pursue.
The second and succeeding cases were suits in the United
States District Court for New Jersey, for the penalty incurred
by selling lottery tickets, without a license. The Court gave
judgment for the defendants, because the laws of New Jersey
made such sale a criminal offense. These judgments were
affirmed in the Circuit Court by Justice GRJER, but reversed
without his dissent, by the Supreme Court, upon the princi-
ples already stated.
Per-a)ear v. Mftss. (1867), 5 Wall.' (72 U. S.) 475, arose
from the indictment of Pervear, in the State Court of Massa-
chusetts, for keeping an illegal drinking place. His defense
was based upon his supposed right to sell (I) from having
procured the liquor seller's license, required by the Internal
Revenue law, and (2) from having paid the tax on the liquor
sold, as required by the same law. Upon the first point the
Act of 1862 provided-
SEc. 64. 4. Retail dealers in liquors, including distilled spirits, fer-
mented liquors, and wines of every description, shall pay twenty dollars
for each license.
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The Acts of March 3, 1863 (12 Stat. at Large, 716) ; June
30, 1864, (13 Id. 252); July 13, 1866 (N4 Id. II6), contained
similar provisions. And the decision of the Supreme Court
of the United States was the same as in the lottery cases just
considered.
The second point %was said by Chief Justice CHASE, in
delivering the opinion of the Court, to be nothing more than
a different form of the first, and not supported by the decision
in Brown v. Md. (anie, page 439), because that case did
not establish the right to sell a package upon which a tax
had been paid to the United States, but merely imported
packages in the hands of the importers; and this, because
the general power of the United States to tax, was admittedly
a power concurrent with the State power of taxation.
A shadow of an argument appeared in the fact that the
sales of the liquor had been in the original packages upon
which the internal revenue tax had been paid. But it has.
already appeared (siora, page 443), that the term, original
package, could not be so used unless there had been an im-
port and the importer was offering for sale the import
without having mingled it with other property taxable by
the State, e. g. by breaking up the original package:
Waring v. The Mayor (1869), 8 Wall. (75 U. S.) iio.
Here Pervear was not an importer and did not aver that his
liquor had been imported even from another State. Hence
the liquor, in contemplation of law, in this appeal from the
highest Court of Massachusetts, was either home-made or in.
second hands, and was therefore subject to the State law, as
decided in the License Cases (s"Pra, pages 453, 457).
There was also an attempt to defend against the State law
as imposing excessive penalties, but it came to nothing-
because the Eighth Amendment does not apply to State
legislation, but is a restriction upon the power of Congres -
For th'is, the case is often cited.
Seven cases were also removed from the Supreme Court
of Iowa, by the various defendants who had been convicted,
under the State law (§ 2359, McClain's Ann. Code, 1888), of
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keeping a place for the sale of intoxicating liquors: The
State v. Carney (1865), 2o Iowa 82, where the opinion of
the State Supreme Court was squarely placed by Judge
DILLON upon section sixty-seven of the Revenue Act: (ante,
page 723). The defendants contended, in the Supreme
Court of the United States, that their licenses gave the right
to sell; and this was denied for the same reasons as those
used in the lottery cases, sufira. These liquor licenses had
been obtained under the same Act of 1862, as in Pervear v.
Mass., sufira.
This exclusiveness of the State authority has been recog-
nized as the important feature in these decisions, by Justice
MILLER, in the Slaughter House Cases (1873), 16 Wall. (83
U. S.) 36, 64; Justice FIELD, in U. S. v. 43 Gals. Whiskey
(1883), io8 U. S. 491; Justice HARLAN, in Mfugler v. Kan-
sas (1887), x23 Id. 623, 646 ; Justice LAMAR, in Kidd v.
Pearson (1888), 128 Id. 1, 24; Justice WOODS, in Presser v.
Illinois (1886), 116 Id. 252, 268.
The License Tax Cases also developed that the possession
of a license did not assure immunity from further regulation.
This subject is much wider than a division of interstate coin-
merce, as it extends (e. g.) into that portion of the domain of
foreign corporation law-which lies beyond the Constitutional
protection of the obligation of contracts: Home Ins. Co. v.
City Council (1876), 3 Otto (93 U. S.) 116, 122; as well as
into all those questions of contract which are within this
Constitutional protection of contracts: Royall v. Va. (1886),
=16 U. S. 572, 580, 583.
XIV.
Imfiorts and extforts are terms afblicable to merchandise
in trade wi/h foreign nations, and not among the States of
the Union.
Goods brought from another State may be taxed, after their
arrival and while in their original jackage.s, because not im-
ports; but there must be no injurious discrimination in the
tax in favor of home-made articles.
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A Stale may nol lax interstate commerce or goods coming
from other States because of their origin.
A Stale may nol lay a stamf5 lax on bills of lading issued
either for ex1 orts or merchandise conszgned to a place in
another Stale.
WUoodruffv. Parham (1869), 8 Wall. (75 U. S.) 123, was
an action of trespass begun in the State Circuit Court of
Mobile, Alabama, by Woodruff & Parker, auctioneers and
commission merchants, of Mobile, against Parham, the tax
collector of that City, for damages suffered by the seizure of
their merchandise for the non-payment of the City tax of
fifty cents on the hundred dollars in value of their gross sales
of merchandise in the original packages in which they came
from other States for this purpose. The payment of the tax
was resisted as inconsistent with Section Ten of the First
Article of the Constitution (suiqra, page 425). Judgment
being rendered against the plaintiffs, they i emoved the case
to the State Supreme Court, where it was affirmed June 5,
1867, on the authority of their decision in Hinson v. Loll
(infra, page 735), on an opinion by Chief Justice WALKER,
41 Ala. 334, 337.
The Alabama Court proceeded upon two grounds: first,
that the States had concurrent power over commercial sub-
jects until Congress positively acted, notwithstanding the
principles of Cooley v. Port Wardens (sli5ra, page 466), out
of which has grown. the present rule, that the State cannot
legislate at all upon subjects admitting of uniform regulation,
as to which the non-action of Congress is significant of an
intention to permit entire freedom: safira, pages 420, 445,
448, 453-
Second, the Alabama Court followed Justices MCLEAN,
CATRON, DANIEL and WOODBUJ , in the License Cases (5
How. 46 U. S. 594, 611, 614, 623), and declared the Con-
stitutional meaning of an import was something introduced
from a foreign country and not from a neighboring State.
This construction involved a consideration of the opinion in
Almy v. State of California (I86I), 24 How. (65 U. S.) 169
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where Chief Justice TANEY, with the assent of Justices MC-
LEAN, ~AYNE, CATRON, NELSON, GRIER, CAMPBELL and
CLIFFORD, declared the State law void for imposing a stamp
tax upon bills of lading for gold and silver transported "from
any point or place in this State, to any point or place with-
out the limits of this State :" Act of April 26; 1858, Statutes
of 1858, page 305. Brown v. Maryland (supra, page 439)
was unqualifiedly followed, though the gold was consigned
to New York City and not to a foreign port, and the Ala-
bama Chief Justice was disingenuous enough to say--
The statement of the facts of the case is very meagre, and found only in
the opinion of the Court. From that statement, it cannot be ascertained
that the gold was not shipped [sic!] to New York, in transitu for some
foreign port. From some expressions in the argument of the Court, we
infer that such was the case: (40 Ala. 134).
An examination of the printed record discloses nothing
to support this inference. On the contrary, the indictment
in the Court of Sessions of the City and County of San Fran-
cisco, charged that-
John C. Almy, Jr., is accused by the Grand Jury of the City and County
of San Francisco, State of California, by this indictment, found this
twentieth day of August, A. D., 1858, of the crime of misdemeanor, com-
mitted as follows:
The said John C. Almy, Jr., " " * * being the master ofsaid ship,
as aforesaid, * * * made and executed, upon a piece of paper, a
written and printed contract with the said Peter Prest, for the transporta-
tion and conveyance of the said gold dust of the value aforesaid, from the
port of San Francisco aforesaid, to the port of New York aforesaid, a
point outside of the limits of the State of California aforesaid, for and in
consideration of one per cent. upon said gold dust, to be paid as freight'
by the said Peter Prest, his order or assign, on delivery of said gold dust
at the Port of New York aforesaid.
Upon a re-argument, the Chief Justice admitted his error,
after examining the printed transcript; but he then took the
position that the question of export to another State had
been passed without notice, and, as decided, was in conflict
with the opinions in the License Cases: (4o Ala. 138, 141).
When these Alabama cases reached the Supreme Court of
the United States, Justice MILLER, in writing the opinion,
adopted this last view of Chief Justice WALKER, to the ex-
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tent that the Court had overlooked the interstate feature of
the bill of lading, and distinguished the precedent of that
opinion by saying that it was well decided as the law con-
flicted with the Constitutional freedom of interstate com-
nerce, within the rule laid down in Crandall v. Nevada,
sujfra, page 464; STRONG, J., in Case of the State Freight
Tax (1873), 15 Wall. (82 U. S.) 232, 28o; BLATCHFORD, J.,
in Pickard v. hlnan S. C. Co. (1886), 117 U. S. 34, 48.
Still, the stamp required by this California law was said to
be an export tax, by Justice BRADLEY, in Pace v. Burgess
(1876), 2 Otto (92 U. S.) 372, 376; and by Justice MILLEm
himself, in the Trade Mark Cases (1879), IO Otto (ioo U.
S.) 82, 95.
As a consequence of these views, the Supreme Court of
the United States unanimously upheld this tax as one im-
posed on all sales of merchandise without regard t6 the State
where the seller resided or whence the goods had been ship-
ped, so long as no injurious discrimination ensued.
As already noticed (szora, page 440), there has been sup-
posed to be a conflict between the principles of Brown v.
Maryland and Woodruff v. Paramn, notwithstanding the
declaration of Justice MILLIR, that the authority of Brown
v. Maryland, was not to be questioned nor its principles
departed from in this decision. The cause of this supposi-
tion may be inferred from the actual point decided in Wood-
ruff v. Parham, as just mentioned in the last paragraph.
The consequences of this principle will be considered later,
in order to observe that the decision thus reached, depended
upon confining the terms, imforts and exforts, to com-
merce with other nations, and to this extent overruling
Aly v. California.
The authority of Brown v. Maryland, therefore, seems to
have been unqualifiedly admitted in connection with the
commerce power, but not with that over imports and ex-
ports; for Justice MI.LzR used this language: -
The case of Brown v. Maryland, as we have already said, arose out of
a statute of that State, taxing by way of discrimination, importers who
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sold by wholesale foreign goods. ChiefJustice MARSMAIL in delivering
the opinion of the Court, distinctly bases the invalidity of the statute, (i)
On the clause of the Constitution which forbids a State to levy imposts or
duties upon imports; and (2) That which confers on Congress the power
to regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the States, and with
the Indian tribes. The casual remark, therefore, made at the close of the
opinion, "That we suppose the principles laid down in this case to apply
equally to importations from a sister State," can only be received as an
intimation of what they might decide if the case ever came before them,
for no such case was then to be decided. Itis not, therefore, ajudicial de-
cision of the question. even if the remark was intended to apply to the
first ground on which that decision was placed.
If the Court then ±leant to say that a tax levied upon goods from a.
sister State, which was not levied on goods )f a similar character produced
within the State, would be in conflict with the clause of the Constitution
giving Congress the right "to regulate commerce among the States,I"
as much as the tax on foreign goods, then under consideration, was in
conflict with the authority "to regulate commerce with foreign nations,"
we agree to the proposition: (8 Wall. 75 U. S. 139).
The sentence here quoted in MARSHALL'S words, had
been objected to by Chief Justice TANEY and Justice Mc-
LEAN, in the License Cases (1847), 5 How. (46 U. S.) 578,
594; and has nearly always been treated, as here, by Justice
MILLER, though without his vital distinction that the fault
lay in applying it to impost taxes, when it should be con-
fined to regulations of interstate commerce. Justice GRAY,
(szpra, page 521), is the last one to fail to observe this
distinction.
This exclusion in Woodrff v. Parkam, of the Constitu-
tional power over exports and imports, in the case of articles
carried from one State to another was immediately recog-
nized by Justice MILLER himself: Hinson v. Loll (1869), 8
Wall. (75 U. S.) 148, 15o; and afterwards by Justice CLIF-
FORD, in Tardv. Maryland (i87), 12 Wall. (79 U. S.)
418, 429; Justice STRONG, in State Tax on Railway Gross
Receilts (1873), 15 Wall. (82 U. S.) 284, 296-7; Chief
Justice CHASE, in Osborne v. lWobile (1873), 16 Wall. (83
U. S.) 479, 482; Justice HARLAN, in Guy v. Balinore
(188O), 100 U. S. 434, 437; and Justice BRADLEY, in Coe v.
Errol (1886), 116 Id. 517, 526; and Brown v. Houslon,
where the decision was such a direct affirmance of Woodruff
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v. Parham on this definition of imports and exports, that
this is the proper place for its consideration.
Brown v. Houston (1885), 114 U. S. 622, was a case which
originated in a petition by S. S. Brown and J. W. Schoen-
maker, of Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, trading as "W. H.
Brown," praying the Judges of the Civil District Court for
the Parish of Orleans, Louisiana, December 30, 188o, to en-
join J. D. Houston, a State tax collector, from seizing and
selling for non-payment of certain taxes, a lot of Pittsburg
coal, then in New Orleans, in the hands of the agents of the
plaintiffs for sale, and still on board the barges in which it
had been transported from Pittsburg. The tax sought to be
enjoined had been assessed under an Act of April 9, 188o
(Laws, pages 88-iO3), for levying taxes on all property in
the State, and the coal assessed was afterwards sold to foreign
steamships and planters by the boatload. The taxes" were
alleged to be illegal, because the coal remained in the original
packages, as the wine did in Low v. Austin (supra, page
443); but with the difference of domestic, instead of foreign,
origin, as in the latter case. Attention is drawn to this
point, because there have been those who thought the de-
cision in Brown v. Hmston to-have been overruled in the
Original Package Case, sufira, page 491.
The injunction was dissolved, February 12, 1881, and
this decree was affirmed on appeal, by the State Supreme
Court, May 16, 1881: (33 La. Ann. 843). The case was
then removed to the Supreme Court of the United States,
and again affirmed, upon the same points of law: first, that
the coal was not an import, with an express affirmance of
Woodru7fv. Parham; second, that a subsequent sale for
foreign use by one who did not allege himself to be an ex-
porter, but simply a seller to any buyer, did not establish a
case for immunity from State taxation. This point was
more emphatically decided in Coe v. Errol (1886), 116 U.
S. 517 (and infra). Third, that the restriction of the terms
inifiorts and exfiorts to trade with foreign nations, does not
operate so as to allow the States of the Union to infringe
upon the Constitutional power to regulate commerce among
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the States. In explaining this point, there was an unquali-
fied affirnance of the rule formulated in Cooley v. Pore
Wardens (ante, page 466), and applied by Justice FIELD in
Weltont v. ifisouri (1876), I Otto (91 U. S.) 275, 282, to
secure the freedom of interstate commerce in the event of
the inaction of Congress upon matters of national character
and admitting of one uniform regulation. Of necessity,
therefore, this tax upon Brown's coal was held not to be a
tax imposed upon a foreign product, or an original package,
or merchandise in transit, but upon property which was
taxed no more and not otherwise than other property in the
State: Per BRADLEY, J., in Coe v. Ei-rol (I886), 116 U. S.
517, 527, and in Robbins v. Taxizg Dist. (1887), 12o Id.
489, 497.
Read in connection with the other cases cited in this sec-
tion, there is no conflict between Brown v. Housion and the
Orziginal Package Case (sitfira, page 491). The difficulty
arose from Justice BRADLEY failing to stop there. Evi-
dently with MARSHALL'S statement (siOra, page 443) in
mind, but without sufficiently regarding the previous caution
in the same case (szqfra, page 442), and perhaps hurriedly as-.
sumning a general professional knowledge of the principles
of the various Passenger Cases (sz"ra, pages 459, 462) and
overlooking a traditional denial of those cases by those who
seek a correct exposition of Constitutional law in the var-
ious opinions delivered in the License Cases (szqfra, pages
453-9), Justice BRADLEY thought the tax to be valid, be-
cause-
The coal had come to its place of rest, for final disposal or use, and was
a commodity in the market of New Orleans. It 'might continue in that
zondition for a year, or two years, or only for a day. It had become a
part of the general mass of property in the State, and as such, it was taxed
for the current year (I88o), as all other property in the City of New Or-
leans was taxed. Under the law, it could not be taxed again until the
following year. It was subjected to no discrimination in favor of goods
which were the product of Louisiana. It was treated in exactly the same
manner as such goods were treated: (114 U. S. 632-3).
That is, there was no attempt to destroy the coal, or con-
fiscate it, or condemn it as a menace to the citizens of the
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State, or as a commodity offensive to the policy of the State;
for-
The taxing of goods, coming from other States, as such, or by reason
of their so coming, would be a discriminating tax against them as imports,
and would be a regulation of interstate commerce, inconsistent with that
perfect freedom of trade which Congress has seen fit should remain undis-
turbed: BRADI.ZY,J. 114 U. S. 633.
Of course, it was carelessness to use the word inports in
this last extract, when the early part of the same opinion had
denied to such goods that term.
The equal rights clause was also invoked, but its applica-
tion was emphatically denied.
There was an affirmance of State laws which do not lay
a discriminating tax on articles from other States, by Justice
FIELD, in Downhan et al. v. City Council of Alexandria
(1870), 10 Wall. (77 U. S.) 173; and Chief Justice CHASE, in
Osborne v. Mobile (1873), 16 Wall. (83 U. S.) 479; but of
this last case, Justice BRADLEY subsequently remarked:-
The State Court relies upon the case of Osborne v. Mobile, which
brought up for consideration, an ordinance of the City, - requiring every
express company, or railroad company doing business in that City, and
having a business extending beyond the limits of the State, to pay an an-
nual license of five hundred dollars ; if the business was confined within
the limits of the State, the license fee was only one hundred dollars; if
confined within the City, it was fifty dollars ; subject in each case to a pen-
alty for neglect or refusal to pay the charge. This Court held that the
ordinance was not unconstitutional. This was in December term, 1872.
In view of the course of decisions which have been made since that time,
it is very certain that such an ordinance would now be regarded as repug-
nant to the power conferred upon Congress to regulate commerce among
the several States: Leloup v. Port of lfobile (i888), 127 U. S. 64o, 647.
Naturally, Chief Justice WAITE, dissenting in Robbins v.
Taxing District (1887), 120 U. S. 489, 5oo, cited the Os-
borne case on the subject of discrimination; which was a cor-
rect use of this opinion, as pointed out by Justice BLATCH-
FORD, in Pickard v. Pullman S. C. Co. (1886), 117 U. S.
34, 50, though without there affirming or denying its
validity.
As Justice MILLER affirmed Leloup v. Port of Mobile, in the
unanimous opinion of the Court in Western Union Tele-
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graik Co. v. Alabama (1889), 132 U. S. 472, 477; and
Chief Justice FULLER, in the opinion for himself and Justices
MILLER, FIELD, BRADLEY, BLATCIrvORD and IAMAR, in
Lyng v. Myizhigan (1890), 135 U. S. 161, 166, againstJustices
HARLAN, GRAY and BREWER, dissenting on the same
grounds as in Leisy v. Hardin. (ante, pages 513-43); the ex-
act result of Woodrif v. Parham, on the validity of State
tax laws which do not discriminate against merchandise on
account of the place of its origin, is, that such tax laws are
strictly confined to the raising of revenue outside of the in-
struments of interstate commerce.
XV.
Liquor brought from another State may be taxed without
discrimination, while in the original lackages.
It is discrimination to tax drunmers or resident agents,
selling liquor brought from another State, at a higher rate
than domestic sellers.
Another Alabama Case reached the Supreme Court of the
United States and was decided at the same time as Woodruff
v. Parham (sufira, page 728), it is here separately considered
that a number of cases arising out of traffic in liquors may
be grouped together. In this Alabama case, John W Hin-
son filed a bill in chancery at Mobile against Lott, as State
and County tax collector, to restrain him, amongst other
things, from levying upon certain liquor brought from Ohio
for sale in Mobile, for a tax of fifty cents per gallon, claimed
under the State Act of February 22, x866 (§ 13, Acts, pages
15-6). The Chancellor dismissed the bill, and, as to this
point, was affirmed by the State Supreme Court, June 6,
1867 (40 Ala. 123), and by the United States Supreme
Court, November 8, 1869 (Hinson v. Lott, 8 Wall. 75 U. S.
148), on an opinion by Justice MILLER, assented to by Chief
Justice CHASE and Justices GRIER, CLIFFORD, SWAYNE,
DAVID DAVIS, FIELD, BRADLEY, and STRONG. Justice
NELSON dissented as he ;hought this case governed by
Al1my v. California (sufira, page 728), as welf as by the
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principle contained in Marshall's much criticised sentence,
quoted by Justice MILLER in Woodruff v. Paraiam (szra,
page 731), concluding that-
It will be seen that the last clause of this article [sufpra, page 45], con-
tains the doctrine of my brethren in the case before us. The people of
one State have the right of egress and regress, to and from the other, for
any purposes of trade and commerce, and the articles may be taxed by
the State into which they are carried; but there must be no discrimina-
tion. We have gone back to the Articles of Confederation, and have in-
corporated into the Constitution by construction, a provision which the
framers of that instrument had rejected as wholly inadequate for the pro-
tection of interstate commerce. Instead, therefore, of adopting this
article into that instrument, they adopted a more complete and thorough-
security to the enjoyment of the privileges of this commerce-" No State
-shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties on
imports or exports:" (8 Wall. 75 U. S. 144-5).
The allusions of Justice NELSON were to Justice MILLER'S
opinion for the majority of the Court, affirming that princi-
ple of Cooley v. Port Wardens which denies a concurrent
right in a State to regulate commerce until Congress should
act: this principle was held to be inapplicable because
another section of the Alabama Act appeared to impose a
like tax on liquors manufactured in the State, and the
thirteenth Section did not discriminate against the liquor
brought from another State.
The Texas liquor case of Tiernan v. Rinker (188o), 12
Otto (3O2 U. S.) 123, began by th6 petition of B. & P.
Tiernan and other liquor sellers to the District Court of Gal-
*veston County, Texas, May 31, 1876, praying for an injunc-
tion against the threatened collection by Selim Rinker as
Cofinty Treasurer of an occupation tax laid by the County
Court, under-
CHAPTER CXXI. An Act Regulating Taxation: (Approved June 3,
1873, Laws, page 198).
SEc. 3. That there shall be levied on and collected from every person,
firm or association of persons, pursuing any of the following named occu-
pations, an annual tax (except when herein otherwise provided) on every
such occupation or separate establishment, as follows: For selling spirit-
uous, vinous, malt and other intoxicating liquors, in quantities less than
one quart, two hundred dollars; in quantities of a quart, and less than
ten gallons, one hundred dollars; Provided, that this section 'shall not be
so construed as to include any wines or beer manufactured in this State,
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o when sold by druggists for medicinal purposes; and provied further,
that this section shall not be so construed as to authorize druggists to sell
spirituous or intoxicating liquors, except alcohol. For selling in quanti-
ties of ten gallons and over, one hundred dollars. " * * 
'
SIC. 4. That the County Courts of the several counties of this State
shall have the power of levying taxes equal to the one-half of the amount
of State tax herein levied, except as hereinbefore provided: * * * *
I The petitioners denied the Constitutionality of such a taxc
because it was in effect discriminative against wine or beer-
sold by them, because manufactured in other States. Au--
gust i I, 1876, the Court sustained Rinker's demurrer; where-
upon the plaintiffs appealed to the State Supreme Court and
obtained a reversal, March 29, 1877, on an opinion by
Associate justice MooiE, based upon the principles of WVel-
ton v. Missouri, (infra, page 751) though as to spirituous
liquor there was no discrimination: Higgins v. Rinker, 47
Texas 381, 391, 393- Rinker then obtained a rehearing
and an affirnance of the decree in his favor, July 1i, 1877..
This was upon an opinion by Chief Justice ROBERTS, who,
drew the distinction that the benefit of the firoviso could.
only be obtained by selling the wine or beer manufactured.
in the State, in an establishment where no spirituous liquors
were sold; the plaintiffs were selling spirituous liquors also,
and therefore they could not complain of discrimination be-
cause they must pay the tax as sellers of spirituous liquors,
the same as if they sold no wine or beer.' Moreover-
If it be held that but one establishnent was contemplated by the law,
embracing the sale of either spirituous liquors, or wines,' or beer, or all
together, then the main object of the law will be defeated by its being
contrary to the Constitution of the United States, and no revenue will be
collected, and no encouragement will be given, either to the manufacture
or the use of wines or beer, or both, in preference to the use of spirituous
liquors: ROBERTS, C. J., Higgins v. Rinker (1877), 47 Texas 393, 4O.
Both this opinion and the concurring one of Associate Jus-
tice GOULD, pointed out the divisibility of the Texas stat-
ute as the distinguishing feature of the case from Wei/on v.
Mfissouri (infra, page 751)
The Judgment was then removed to the Supreme Court
of the United States, and there affirmed, November 15,
188o, upon the unanimous opinion of Justice FIELD, recog-
VOL. XXXVIII-47.
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nizing and approving both the doctrine of Wellon v. Ai-
.souri, and the distinction drawn by the Texas Court: (12
,Otto, 102 U. S. 127). The case is therefore chiefly valuable
'as an instance of exceedingly fair dealing with a State stat-
ute. The principle of yielding to the construction of the
State Court was also followed in lYacdine Co. v. Gage (188o),
io Otto (ioo U. S.) 676, and (infra, page 753), though the
true principle is to examine the obvious effect of the statute
under consideration. This is the principle upon which all
State laws, laying taxes upon persons, have been declared
-void: supra, page 441, and infra, page 755.
Another liquor case began in the Police Court of Grand
-Rapids, Michigan, June 19, 1883, by complaint against
'Samuel A. Walling, for selling at wholesale without paying
Athe tax required by-
AN ACT to impose a tax on the business of selling spirituous and in-
"toxicating, malt, brewed, and fermented liquors in the State of Michigan
--to be shipped from without this State: (Approved May 3, 1875, Laws,
,pages 271-2; Howell's Stat. 1277).
SEc¢Iox i. The People ofthe State of.Michigan enact, That every per-
:.-son who shall come into, or being in this State, shall engage in the busi-
-mess of selling spirituous and intoxicating, malt, brewed, or fermented
liquors to citizens or residents of this State, at wholesale, or soliciting or
•taking orders from citizens or residents of this State for any such liquors,
t-o be shipped into this State, or furnished, or supplied at wholesale to
--any person within this State, by a person, co-partnership, association, or
- corporation, not resident in this State, nor having his, their, or its prin-
cipal place of business within this State, shall, on or before the fourth
Friday ofjune in each year, pay a tax of three hundred dollars if engaged
3n selling, or soliciting, or taking orders for the sale of such spirituous
:and intoxicating liquors, and one hundred dollars for malt, brewed, or
-Termented liquors. Such tax to be paid to the Auditor General, and be
by him paid into the State treasury, to the credit of the general fund.
[The remaining sections provide for exhibiting the tax receipt and for
- punishing violation of the law]
.'_By Act of May 19, 1881 (Laws, pages 148-9); Howell's
'Stat. § 1281), in force at the time of Walling's arrest, resi-
dent liquor manufacturers and wholesale dealers were taxed
two hundred dollars for sales of malt, brewed, or fermented
liquors, and five hundred dollars for sales of spirituous or
-intoxicating liquors; so that the discrimination was in favor
.of dealers in other States, but was strongly against drum-
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iners from other States, as agents of resident dealers paid
in tax at all.
Walling was convicted and fined by the Police Judge:
and, on appeal, in the Circuit Court of Kent County, the
Judge (Hon. ROBERT M. MONTGOMERY), charging the jury
that as the statute had not been passed upon by the State
Supreme Court, he would treat it as valid. This conviction
was affirmed, April 9, 1884, by the State Supreme Court, on
an opinion by SHERWOOD, J., with the concurrence of
THOMAS M. COOLEY, C. J., and CAMPBELL, and CHAMP-
LIN, A. JJ.: The Peofile v. Walling, 53 Mich. 264.
The defences set up were all relative to the Constitution-
ality of the Act: first, that it was contrary to the State Con-
stitution, which was denied by Judge SHERWOOD; second,
that it was contrary to the commerce, equal rights, and im-
ports clauses of the Constitution of the United States. On
this second point, of course the License Cases and Voodruff
v. Parhiam were considered sufficient authority.
The case was then removed to* the Supreme Court of the
United States, where the judgment was reversed (January
i8, 1886; 116 U. S. 446), on an opinion by Justice BRAD-
LEY, with the concurrence of all the Justices, except Chief
Justice WAITE (who did not sit), because the State law im-
posed a tax discriminating against persons selling goods to
be brought from another State; this was expressly upon the
authority of Welfon v. Missouri (infra, page 751), and
Brown v. Houston (szqfra, page 732): and as to the exclu-
siveness of the Constitutional power over interstate com-
merce, upon the concurring opinion of Justice JOHNSON in
Gibbons v. Ogden.
The latest of the liquor cases also arose in the State of
Michigan, in the State Circuit Court for Iron County, in the
prosecution of Henry Lyng, as agent of a Wisconsin firm,
for selling lager beer at wholesale, in the original packages
in which it had been shipped, and without having com-
plied with-
AN ACT to provide for the taxation and regulation of the business of
manufacturing, selling, keeping for sale, furnishing, giving, or deliver-
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ing spirituous and intoxicating liquors, and malt, brewed, or fermented
liquors and vinous liquors in this State, and to repeal all acts or parts
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. Approved, June 28, 1887:
Public acts, 446-6o.
SecTIoN i. The People of he State of Michigan enact, That in all
townships, cities and villages of this State, there shall be paid annually,
the following tax upon the business of manufacturing, selling or keeping
for sale, by all persons whose business, in whole or in part, consists in
selling, or keeping for sale, or manufacturing, distilled, or brewed, or
maltliquors, or mixed liquors as follows: ** * * Upon the busi-
ness of selling only brewed or malt liquors, at wholesale or retail, or at
wholesale and retail, three hundred dollars per annum ; upon the busi-
ness of selling spirituous or intoxicating liquors at wholesale, five hun-
dred dollars; or at wholesale and retail, eight hundred dollars perannum ;
upon the business of manufacturing brewed or malt liquors for sale, sixty-
five dollars per annum; upon the business of manufacturing for sale
spirituous or intoxicating liquors, eight hundred dollars per annum. No
person paying a tax on spirituous or intoxicating liquors under this act
shall be liable to pay any tax on the sale of malt, brewed, or fermented
liquors. No person paying a manufacturer's tax on brewed or malt li-
quors under this act, shall be liable to pay a wholesale dealer's tax on the
same.
Having been convicted,.Lyng removed the case to the
State Supreme Court, where the judgment was directed to
be entered against him (April i9, 1889), on an opinion by
LONG, J., in which there was frst, a denial of any discrimina-
tion such as in Walling v. Mizchiganz (szpra, page 738), be-
cause the liquor might have been manufactured within the
State, and second, a repetition of the legal heresy that de-
livery to the consignee terminated interstate commerce.
The Supreme Court of the United States, on removal to that
Court, again denied the principles upon which the Michigan
Court proceeded: Lyng v. A1fic/zigan (189o), 135 U. S. 161,
Chief Justice FULLER pointing out that the manufacturer
in another State was required by this unconstitutional law,
to pay three hundred dollars, while the Michigan brewer only
sixty-five dollars. justices HARLAN, GRAY and BmwER dis-
sented upon the grounds stated in their dissent in (Leisy v.
Hardin, ante, pages 513-44).
The effect of Hinson v. Loll and Woodrzff v. Parham, in
allowing a State to tax, so long as no discrimination was
practiced against the products of other States, appeared in a
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number of State laws ingeniously contrived for the purpose
of going at least up to this boundary line. In addition to
the laws designed to have a general effect (szra, pages 727-
8), and those relating to the liquor traffic, just treated of,
there was another important class intended to restrain trav-
eling salesmen. Such laws are considered together, under
the case of W~ard v. JMayyland, byra, page 748.
XvI.
Congress can not exercise police powers within a Slate:
though a State can not, by itsfpolice power, prevent interstate
cominerce.
The Supreme Court of the United States will tphold Stale
Police regulations, when enacded in good faili and aipro-
firiale to the protection of if/e, liberty and fpropierly.
A frovision in an internal revenue act, fixing the flashing
Point of illuninaling oil, is o no effect in a State.
A palent for illuminating oil, is no defense for violating a
Slate regulation forbidding the sale of suck oil.
Tle United Stales v. De Will (187o), 9 Wall. (76 U. S.) 41,
under another section of the Internal Revenue Act, also
raised the question of the exclusiveness of State authority in
local affairs. DeWitt was indicted in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, under
Section twenty-nine of the Act of March 2, 3867 (I Stat.
at Large 484), amending the Internal Revenue laws, by
making a misdemeanor the sale of illuminating petroleum
oil which was inflammable at less than 11o Fahrenheit. To
this indictment a demurrer was interposed, that this section
was not a valid and Constitutional law, and justice SwAYNE
and the District Judge W¥ILKINS differing, June 6, i868, the
case was certified to the Supreme Court, where the Attorney
,General argued in support of the law, that it was for taxation
merely, thus conceding the power of the State over police
regulations. But Chief Justice CHASE thought this section
a police regulation and consequently not valid within the
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territory oi a State, citing the License Cases, the Passenger
Cases and the License Tax Cases, supra, pages 453, 460,
722.
That such matters lay exclusively within the police power
of the States, was distinctly affirmed on the authority of U..
S. v. DeWit, in Patterson v: K-enlucky (1879), 7 Otto (97
U. S.) 501, where Patterson had been indicted, December ii,
1874, in the Paducah City Court, for selling Aurora Oil after
it had been condemned by the State inspector as unsafe for
illuminating purposes, under the Kentucky act of February
21, 1874. This oil had been patented by the defendant and
the patent was set up as a defense, so as to raise a conflict
between the United States Patent laws and the State act.
Upon appeal, the judgment was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, September 22, 1875, quoting the decision of KENT,
in one of the cases arising out of the steamboat monopoly of
Livingston and Fulton(sura, page 429), and U. S. v. De Will,
just considered, and concluding:-
The right of a State to protect its citizens from the danger attending
the use of such fluids, although patented, is not inconsistent with any
patent regulation, nor in violation of the Federal Constitution: (ii Bush,
Ky., 311, 316).
The case was then removed to the Supreme "Court of the
United States, where thejudgment was again affirmed, Justice
HARLAN delivering the unanimous opinion of the Court that
the Kentucky statute was a police regulation against which
the patent laws of the United States conferred no immunity,
because-
The right to sell the'Aurora Oil was not derived from the patent; that
right existed before the patent, and unless prohibited by valid local laws,
could have been exercised without the grant of letters patent. The right
which the patent primarily secures, is the exclusive right in the discovery,
which is an incorporeal right, or, in the language of Lord MANsI Dr, in
millar v. Taylor (1769), 4 Burr. 2303, "a property innotion," which "has
no corporeal tangible substance." The enjoyment ofthat incorporeal right
may be secured and protected by national authority, against all hostile
State legislation; but the tangible property which comes into existence
by the application of the discovery is not beyond the control, as to its
use, of State legislation, simply because the inventor acquires a monopolyr
in the discovery: (7 Otto 97 U. S. 5o6.)
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This decision that the patent laws did not prevent State-
laws from requiring a license for the sale of the patent article,.
or other regulation, was followed in Webber v. Virginia
(1881), 13 Otto (103 U. S.) 344; but the ingenuity of State
evasion required that it should be allowed no further effecL
For, in MVinnesota v. Barber (189o), 136 U. S. 313, the-
Court was asked to recognize the police power of the State, not
only over degrees of fire test for illuminating oil, but also-
over the time between killing and offering meat for sale-
Justice HARLAN replied, that-
There is no real analogy betveen that case and the one before us. The
Kentucky Statute prescribed no test of inspection, which, in -the nature-
of the property, was either unusual or unreasonable, or which, by its ne-
cessary operation, discriminated against any particular oil because of the:
locality of its production. * * * *
But a law providing for the inspection of animals whose meats are de-
signed for human food, cannot be regarded as a rightful exertion of the-
police powers of the State, if the inspection prescribed is of such a char-
acter, or is burdened with such conditions, as will prevent altogether the
introduction into the State, of sound meats, the prodtuct of animals
slaughtered in other States: (136 U. S. 327, 328).
XVII.
The Constitutional power to regulate commerce extends
over that commerce which, though carried on within a Slate,.
is apart of interstate or foreign commerce.
Navigable waters of the Uited States are those used as r
fart of tei means for interstate and foreign commerce.
A steamboat navigating only within a State, must have thMe
United Slates license, if she cariies freight and fassengers
ultimately destined to another State or a foreign, nation.
Trans-shipment ojfreight destined to anther Slate or na-
lion, does not so break uf the carriage as to remove it from
the Constitutional fower into the domain of the State's police-
fower.
The Constitutional power cannot be defeated by the number
of sefarate carriers, or similar details.
THE LAW GOVERNING
The case of The Daniel Ball lies within the purview of
.this article because it called for an examination of the Con-
,stitutional power over commerce within a State. Had the
-views of Justice WOODBURY (anle, page 462) prevailed, it
-would have been enough to say that the principle upon
-which they rested would have authoritatively settled this
case the other way from the final judgment of the Supreme
,Court of the United States.
The case began by an information filed in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Michigan,
April 2, 1868, against the steamboat Daniel Ball, for navi-
gatifig the Grand River, in that State, with merchandise and
passengers, but without the United States license required
by-
CHAP. CXCI. An act to provide for the better security of the lives of
passengers on board of vessels propelled in whole or in part by sleam.
Approved July 7, 1838 ; 5 Stat. at Large 3o4.
SEC. 2. And be it farther enacted, That it shall not be lawful for the
-owner, master or captain of any steamboat or vessel propelled in whole
-or in part by steam, to transport any goods, wares, and merchandise, or
passengers, in or upon the bays, lakes, rivers, or other navigable waters of
the United States, from and after the said first day of October, one thou-
sand, eight hundred and thirty-eight; without having first obtained, from
the proper officer, a license under the existing laws, and without having
complied with the conditions imposed by this act; and for eachand every
-violation of this section, the owner or owners of said vessel shall forfeit
and pay to the United States, the sum of five hundred dollars, one-half
for the use of the informer; and for which sum or sums the steamboat or
vessel so engaged, shall be liable, and may be seized and proceeded
against summarily, by way of libel, in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the offense.
This statute was repealed by the Act of Febfuary 28,
1871, which substituted the description of waters:-
SIC. 41. A nd be it further enacted, That all steamers navigating the
lakes, bays, inlets, sounds, rivers, harbors, or other navigable waters of
the United States, when such waters are common highways of commerce,
o-r open to general or competitive navigation, shall be subject totheprovi-
Lions of this Act: Provided, That this act shall not apply to public ves-
sels of the United States, or vessels of other countries, nor to boats, pro-
-pelled in whole, or in part, by steam, for navigating canals: (16 Stat. at
Larg 453).
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In the Revised Statutes, this language was simplified
into-
SEc. 4400. All steam vessels navigating any waters of the United
Rtates which are common highways of commerce, or open to general or
competitive navigation, excepting public vessels of the United States, ves-
-sels of other countries, and boats propelled in whole or in part by steam
for navigating canals, shall be subject to the provisions of this Title.
The defense offered was that the steamer was so constructed
as to be incapable of navigating the waters of Lake Michi-
gan, into which the river emptied; that her passengers and
cargo, when destined to other States, were delivered to for-
warding agents at Grand Haven, and by them sent on to
their destination; and that, consequently, the steamer was
engaged in domestic State commerce only, and not in the
navigation subject to the laws of the United States.
The United States District Judge (SoLoINIoN L. WITHEM)
dismissed the libel, July 28, 1868, (1 Brown 202) in order to
secure uniformity of decision in the two Districts of the
State, and not because he agreed with the reasoning which
made trans-shipment a determining fact against the very pur-
pose of that change of carriers. The case was then re-
moved to the Circuit Court where (November 6, 1868) the
decree was reversed, the libel sustained and the penalty
decreed, the Court being composed of Justice SWAYNE and
the District Judge. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the
reasoning of the District Judge and the decree of the Cir-
cuit Court were affirmed upon a unanimous opinion by Jus-
tice FIELD (January 23, 1871; :o Wall. 77 U. S. 557),
upon two grounds: first, that the River was a navigable
water of the United States, in contradistinction to the navi-
gable waters of a State, because it formed, iiz its ordinary
condition, and in connection with other waters, a continuous
highway over which commerce might be, and was, carried
-on with other States or foreign countries, in the customary
modes. The words printed in italics serve to distinguish
this case from Veazie v. Mfoor (1852), 14 How. (55 U. S.)
568, 574 (infra, page 823), and Escanaba Co. v. Chicago
,(1883), 107 U. S. 678, 682, which were in fact but applica-
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tions of the principles of Willson v. The Mfarst Co. sztbra,
pages 445, 482: as well as to prevent a misapprehension,
from the citation by Justice FIELD, of. The Genessee Cziel
(1851), 12 How. (53 U. S.) 443, and Hine v. Trevor (1867),
4 Wall. (7 1 U. S.) 555, which involved the general doctrine
of navigability in America. That question is at rest: Ex
fiarle Boyer (1884), 1O9 U. S. 629 ; The Eagle (1869), .8
Wall. (75 U. S.) 15; Tle lfonlello (1871), i Wall. (78 U.
S.) 411, and (1874), 20 Wall. (87 U. S.) 436, where the
principles of the opinion in the case of the Daniel Ball,
were applied to the Fox River, Wisconsin, notwithstanding
portages around obstructions. Moreover, both the subject
and limits of this article forbid even a fuller discussion ot
the difference between waters not subject to Congressional
regulation and those like the Grand River, just as when dis-
cussing the bridge cases (ante, pages 480-I), the power to
bridge was considered only in connection with interstate
and foreign commerce.
The second ground for the opinion of Justice FIELD was
the destination of the steamer's merchandise and passengers,
notwithstanding the fact that the steamer was not run in
connection with any other carrier : that is-
Whenever a commodity has begun to move as an article of trade front
one State to another, commerce in that commodity between the States
has commenced. The fact that several differentand independent agencies
are employed in transporting the commodity, some actingentirely in one
State, and some acting through two or more States, does in no respect af-
fect the character of the transaction. To the extent in which each agency
acts in that transportation, it is subject to the regulation of Congress:
FIEID, J., The Daniel Ball (1871), io Wall. (77 U. S.) 557, 565.
This statement was avowedly founded on MARSHALL'S
definition of the force of "Among" (supra, page 435) and
the possibility of defeating the Congressional power by the
simple expedient of combining different carriers, each taking
up the transportation at the boundary line of the adjoining
States. The propriety of avoiding this possibility, which
might arise through change of carriers, or other accidents or
conveniences of commerce, was repeated by. the same jus-
tice in the Brooklyn Bridge case of Mfiller v. M7fayor of New
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York (1883), 109 U. S. 385,.395, and had one of its most
salutary applications in the case of Heck & Petree v. East
Ten., Vir. & Ga. RR. Co. decided: by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, on a report and opinion by Commissioner
MORlSON, February 15, 1888 (3 Ann. Report 211; 27
AMER. LAW REGISTER 273). The complainants were re-
fused transportation of their coal from their mines located on
the Coal Creek & New River Railroad.' This railroad was
the only means for carrying the complainants' coal from
their mines, and yet presumed to deny transportation upon
the ground that it 'was a State corporation -whose line was
wholly within the State of Tennessee. But the opinion de-
clared this railroad to be one of the instrumentalities of
shipment or carriage included in the term "transportation,"
and the complainants therefore to be entitled to have their
coal carried out on its 'way to market in another State. The
actual cause of the refusal to carry the coal, 'was a disagree-
ment amongst the stockholders, and on this account a Con-
stitutional question 'was raised and decided for the benefit of'
the public.
The principle that the commencement of the 'movement,
of merchandise destined for another State or nation, is the
period of time 'when the Congressional power attaches, was
afterwards distinctly declared -in Coe v. Errol (infra) as well
as recognized in Aidd v. Pearson (1888), 128 U. S. I, 25 ;
to that portion of this article, reference may be made for
further examination.
XVIII.
A State lax vfion a drummer or ferson who sells by sam-
file, catalogue or trade list, or 20on one whose ocuation con-
sists in selling goods, is a tax 2ifon the goods and not a mere
license to carry on the avocation.
A non-resident cannot be required to fpay a tax measured
by his stock of goods in another State, or by his capacity to do
business all over the United Stales and not merely within the-
taxing State.
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A non-resident who opens a place of business and einqloys
drummers in a State, cannot object to State taxes which are no
greater than those imposed 2on residents of the State: but
there must be do discrimination.
Any tax or fee, imfosed ufpon non-resident dealers or their
salesmen, maintaining no place of business in the State, is a
tax tpon interstate commerce, and is void.
A State cannot require a non-resident drummer to pay a
licensefeejor the frivilege of selling.
A non-resident's exemption from State taxation is not a
greater frivilege than emioyed by residents: the State has
the power to tax residents, and in that way, the ability to
prefer non-residents.
Commerce between a State and the District of Columbia
cannot be restrained by munidfial regulations in the District
to any greater extent than commerce among the several
,States.
Congressional regulations of commerce must be general
and not local.
The agent of a distant but interstate railroad may solicit
passengers without paying a State license fee.
Commerce among the States includes commerce out of, as
well as into a State.
A State may not tax commerce amozg other States.
The agents and other facilities selected by interstate car-
rliers need not be essential to the conduct of their business in
order to prevent State regulation or taxation.
In Ward v. Mdaryland (1871) 12 Wall. (79 U. S.) 418, the
Grand Jury for the City of Baltimore, December 4, 1868,
prosecuted Elias Ward, a non-resident, for offering to sell
certain merchandise by sample, without the license required
by Act of March 30, 1868, repealing certain Amendments
of the Code and substituting the following section:-
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37. No person, not being a permanent resident in this State, shall sell,
offer for sale, or expose for sale, within the limits of the City of Balti-
more, any goods, wares, or merchandise whatever, other than agricul-
tural products, and articles manufactured in the State of Maryland,
within the limits of the said City, either by card, sample, or other speci-
men, or by written or printed trade list or catalogue, whether such person
be the maker or manufacturer thereof or not, without first obtaining a
license so to do: [Chap. 413, Laws, pages 786-7: the other clauses
merely enforcing the above.]
This license was double that required of a resident of the
State.
Ward having admitted the facts, was adjudged guilty and
fined. On appeal, this judgment was affirmed, the State
Court denying that the law transgressed the commerce or
equal rights clauses of the Constitution: Ward v. The Stale
(1869), 31 Md. 279. That is, the State Court held the tax
to be one on a person, and not on goods which were not
even alleged to be in the original packages in which they
had been brought into the State:-
There is nothing in this, or any other law of the State, which prohibits
or restrains non-resident merchants, manufacturers, or traders, or other
agents, from bringing their goods here, and selling them in the same
mode and under the same license as residents of the State. A custom,,
however, has grown up in receuttimes with merchants and manufacturers,
in the large matiufacturing and commercial cities and States, of traveling
or sending agents or runners through other States and cities, with samples,
cards, catalogues, or trade-lists of their goods, and thereby selling by re-
tail, or wholesale, large quantities of merchandise, located beyond the
limits of the States, where they thus sell, and not subject to the local
State, county, or municipal taxation, as are like goods in the hands of
resident merchants, or traders, to the great detriment of the business and
trade of the latter. Large sales are thus made, and an extensive and lu-
crative business is thus carried on, and it is the object of the law in ques-
'tion to search and subject to taxation, by means of a license, the trade
and business thus transacted within the limits of the principal City of this
State. It is,. therefore, a tax upon a particular business or trade, carried
on in a particular mode within the limits of the State, by a particular class
of persons, and not a tax upon goods or merchandise imported into a
State, either from foreign countries, or from States, and the question is
as to the power of the State to impose such tax: MIrrER, J., 31 Md., 285.
Appealing to the Supreme Court of the United States,
Ward secured a reversal on the ground that the equal rights
clause of the Constitution [Art. IV. Sec. 2], had been vio-
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lated; the opinion was written by Justice CLIFFORD, with
the assent of Chief Justice CHASE, and Justices NELSON,
SWAYNE, DAVID DAVIS, STRONG, MILLER and FIELD.
Justice BRADLEY went further and thought the commerce
clause had been violated also, for-
Such a law would effectually prevent the manufacturers of the manu-
facturing States from selling their goods in other States, unless they estab-
lished commercial houses therein, or sold to resident merchants who chose
to send them orders. It is, in fact, a duty upon importation from one
State to another, under the name of a tax: (12 Wall. 79 U. S. 432-3).
Without enforcing or repealing the law thus declared un-
constitutional (BARTOL, C. J., 57 Md., 263), the Maryland
legislature amended the sections of the Code applicable to
resident traders, so that-
SEc. 41. No person or corporation, other than the grower, maker, or
manufacturer, shall barter or sell, or otherwise dispose of, or shall offer
for sale, any goods, chattels, wares or merchandise, within this State,
without first obtaining a license in the manner herein prescribed: pro-
vided, persons carrying on the shad and herring fisheries in this State may
sell and dispose of so much salt as may be necessary to cure the fish pur-
,chased of them during the months of March, April and May, and no
longer, without license, and that nothing herein contained shall extend
to vendors of cakes, or to the vendors of beer and cider, who are the
makers of such beer and cider, but nothing herein shall exempt any vend-
ors of lager beer, from the requirements to obtain a license to sell said
lager beer: Chap. 349, Laws of I88o; still in force, Pub. Gen. L., I888,
Art. 56, ' 35-
Under this Chapter, a New Yorker, George W. Corson,
was indicted March 22, 1881, for selling tea by sample to a
Baltimorean, and being convicted, appealed to the State
Court of Appeals. "That tribunal thought that Ward had
escaped because the law (supra, page 749), had discriminated
against a non-resident, but here, in Corson's case, the new
law seemed impartial. Nor could the State Court appreciate
the argunment founded upon the amount of the license, fixed
by-
SEc. 43. The applicant shall state to the clerk on oath, to be adminis-
tered by the clerk, or if the applicant reside in a county, to be adminis-
tered by the said clerk or any justice of the peace, the amount of said
applicant's stock of goods, wares and merchandise generally kepton hand
by him or the concern in which he is engaged, at the principal season of
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sale; or if said applicant shall not have previously engaged in such trade
r business, the amount of such stock he expects to keep as aforesaid:
Chap. 414, 3, Laws of 1858; still in force, Pub. Gen. L., 1888, Art. 56,
37.
Corson contended that this Section operated to tax prop-
erty out of the limits of the State; and although this was
denied by Chief Judge BARTOL, in delivering the opinion
(57 Md. 251, 266), which affirihed Corson's conviction (July
22, 1881), because the tax was not on goods but by a stan-
dari fixed by the value of the goods; yet this contention had
great weight in the Supreme Court of the United States,
where the case was removed and reversed, March 7, 1887.
This case of Corson v. 3faryland (i 2o U. S. 502), was heard,
with Robbins v. Taxing District (infra, page 758), and the
State law declared unconstitutional for the same reasons;
but the dissenting Justices in the Robbins Case, here agreed
to the judgment of reversal of the Maryland conviction, be-
cause the license required in that State was, in their opinion,
measured by the capacity of the drummer's principal to do
business all over the United States, and without reference to
the amount done or to be done in Maryland: per WAIm, C.
J., 120 U. S. 5o6.
Weltonv. State of Jlissouri(1876), I Otto (91 U. S.) 275,
was another license case which began by the indictment of
M. M. Welton, April 13, 1872, in the State Circuit Court for
the County of Henry, State of Missouri, for selling sewing
machines manufactured in another State, without the license
required by-
SEcTIoN i. Whoever shall deal in the selling of [patents, patentrights]
patent or other medicines, [lightning rods] goods, wares or merchandise,
except books, charts, maps and stationery, which are not thegrowth,pro-
duce or vantfacture ofthis State, by going about from place to place to
sell the same, is declared to be a peddler; Gen. Stat. 1865, chapter 96,
page 417; Wagner's Stat. 979, as amended byAct of April 12, 1877, Laws,
page 295, striking out the words in italics and inserting the bracketed
words; Rev. Stat. 1879, 6471 and 1889, 72II.
SFc. 2. No person shall deal as a peddler without a license; and no
two or more persons shall deal under the same license, either as partners,
agents, or otherwise ; and no peddler shall sell wines or spirituous liquors:
Id. and Rev. Stat 1879, 647i, and 1889, 7212.
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Being convicted, notwithstanding the defence of the
repugnancy of this State law to the Constitutional provisions,
regulating commerce and forbidding imposts (szra, pages
420, 425), Welton removed the case to the State Supreme
Court; where the judgment was affirmed, January 26, 1874.
on an opinion in which Wardv. Maryland, (szqfra, page 748)
was distinguished on the ground there and often supposed to
prevent the law being obnoxious to the Constitutional pro-
vision: namely that the tax was on the person, and not on
the goods.
The law in question [in the Maryland case], discriminated between citi-
zens of Maryland and citizens of other States pursuing the same calling in
Maryland, and levied a higher tax upon the nonresident peddler. But
there is no such feature in our law. Whether the peddler comes from
Maine or Louisiana, or has been born and lived here all his life, makes no"
difference in the tax he pays for a peddler's license: NAPTON, J., State
v. Wyelton (1874), 55 Mo. 288, 291.
The judgment was then removed to the Supreme Court of
the United States, and there reversed upon a unanimous
opinion by Justice FIELD, on the ground of discrimination in
the State statute against the growth, products and manufac-
tures of another State, as no license was required for ped-
dling such articles, if of Missouri origin; that is, following
Brown v. iMamyland (sufira, page 439).
Where the business, or occupation, consists in the sale of goods, the
license tax required for its pursuit, is in effect a tax upon the goods them-
selves. If such a tax be within the power of the State to levy, it matters
not whether it be raised directly from the goods, or indirectly from them
through a license to the dealer; but, if such tax conflict with any power
vested in Congress by the Constitution of the United States, it will not be
any less invalid because enforced through the form of a personal license,
FIELD,J., Vellon v. lhlo. (1876), I Otto (91 U. S.) 275,278.
Alluding to the exception of injurious discrimination, in
Woodruff v. Parham (subra, pages 728, 73o), and declar-
ing that inaction by Congress is equivalent to a declaration
of freedom, and quoting from Brown v. .3fay)land, the
immunity there declared for original packages within the
Constitutional meaning of this expression (sztra, page 443),
the opinion proceeded:-
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Following the guarded language of the Court in that case [of Brown
v. Mlaryland], we observe here, as was observed there, that it would be
premature to state any rule which would be universal in its application,
to determine when the commercial power of the Federal Government over
a commodity has ceased, and the power of the State has commenced. It
is sufficient to hold now that the commercial power continues until the
commodity has ceased to be the subject of discriminating legislation by
reason of its foreign character. That power protects it, even after it has-
entered the State, from any burdens inposed by reason of its foreign
origin. The Act of Missouri encroaches upon this power in this respect,
and is therefore, in our judgment unconstitutional and void: FIELD, J.,
Wellon v. Mo. (1876), i Otto (9i U. S.) 275, 282.
W ellon v. Missouri was one of the decisions, which its
writer afterwards supposed (in 2lzWgler. v. Kansas, 1887, 123
U. S. 623, 676) to be an abandonment of the Constitutional
construction upon which the License Cases had been de-
cided: this has already been alluded to and a quotation
printed on page 459, szqfra. Here may be added that
Justice BRADLEY had previously extracted the general prin-
ciple of non-taxation of goods carried from State to State
because of their origin .(Plzila. & S. . S. Co. v. Comm.
Pa,, 1887, 122 U. S. 326, 341), as well as potency of Con-
gressional non-action (Robbizs v. Taxing Dist., 1887, 120
U. S. 489, 493; Walling v. Mich., 1886, 116 id. 446, 454;
and Brown v. Houston, 1885, 114 Id. 622, 631); so also,
justice BLATCHFORD in Pickard v. Pullnan S. Car Co.,
(X886) 117 Id. 34, 49; Justice SWAYNE in Machune Co. v.
Gage (188o), lO Otto (ioo U. S.) 676, 678; and Chief Justice
WAITE in Hall v. De Cdr (1878), 5 Otto (9S U. S.) 485,
490; as had Justice MILLER, the principle against discrim-
ination (Wabash, St. L. 6 P. RR. Co. v. Ill., 1886, II1
U. S. 557, 574, 589; Cook v. Pa., 1878, 7 Otto 97 U. S.
566, 573); so also Justice HARLAN in Guy v. Baltimore,
(i 8o) 10 Otto (100 U. S.) 434, 439.
All of these principles depending upon the doctrine of
Cooley v. Port Wardens (stfra, page 466), as Justice FIELD
said himself (Mobze Co. v. Kimball, 1881, 12 Otto 1O2 U. S.
691, 702), so that the License Cases would seem to have been
in fact overruled within five years after their decision.
The Howe Machine Co. v. Gage (I88o), IO Otto (IOO U.
VOL. XXXVIII.-48.
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S.) 676, originated before S. HEERMANS, Justice 'of the
Peace of Sumner County, Tennessee, March 30, 1876, by
the plaintiffs suing the County Clerk to recover fifteen
,dollars and costs paid him under protest for the privilege of
peddling sewing machines in that County, under the provi-
sions of the Code, Section 553, in subsection 43, now in-
creased to twenty dollars by Section 618 of the Code of
1884. Peddlers of articles manufactured, or made up in
the State and of scientific and religious books (Code of
1871, § 546), and all articles manufactured of the produce of
the State (Act of March 24, 1875, Chap. 98, § x) were at
this exempt, in obedience to-
SEc. 3o . No article manufactured of the produce of this State, shall be
-taxed otherwise than to pay inspection fees: Const. 187o, Art. II.
The judgment was rendered in favor of the Clerk, and
-the plaintiffs appealed to the State Circuit Court, where the
judgment was affirmed, November 13, 1876, on an agreed
statement of facts, that the plaintiffs manufactured their
sewing machines in Connecticut, but had an office in Nash-
-ville, Tennessee, from whence the agent had traveled in a
-wagon, peddling the. machines through the country districts.
The plaintiffs then appealed to the State Supreme Court,
-where the judgment was again affirmed, March 2, 1877, upon
an opinion distinguishing U/elloiz v. M~issouri (supra, page
751), where the statute was aimed directly at the importa-
tion and peddling of merchandise; for-
Our statute is comprehensive and applies to the resident as well as the
monresident-to home manufacturers as well as to the importer of foreign
goods, or goods manufactured out of, and not of the growth or produce
of the State; it is not an attempt to lay imposts, or duties on imports
or exports, but broadly levies a tax upon all peddlers of sewing machines
,without regard to place of growth, or produce of material, or of manu-
facture. Again, while our [State] Constitution ordains that no article
manufactured of the produce of the Sta'e, shall be taxed otherwise
than to pay inspection fees, it also ordains, as we have already noticed,
that "the Legislature shall have power to tax merchants, peddlers, and
,privileges," etc. The two clauses must be construed pari piassu, and ef-
feet given to each: TURNEY, J., Mfachine Co. v. Cage [sic] (1877), 9
-Baxter.(Tenn.) 518, 521.
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The plaintiffs then removed the judgment to the Supreme
Court of the United States, where the judgment was again
and finally affirmed, March 29, i88o, on a unanimous opin-
ion by Justice SWAYNE, who professed to be bound by the
construction put upon the State Constitution and laivs by
the State Court. For this, he cited Lefbzgwell v. W4arren
(1862), z Black (67 U. S.) 599.
The same principle of following the decisions of State
Court, construing State Constitutions and laws, was observed
in the Texas liquor cases (siora, page 736), and is therefore
worthy of some examination here. The great number of
cases in which the principle has been followed, forbids any
complete mention of them, and perhaps the briefest practical
method is to refer to a recent case where the principle was
recognized and restrained thus :-
In the case of the petitioner brought here by writ of error to the Su-
preme Court of California, our jurisdiction is limited to the question,
whether the plaintiff in error has been denied a right in violation of the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. The question whether
his imprisonment is illegal under the Constitution and laws of the State,
is not open to us. And, although that question might have been consid-
ered in the Circuit Court, in the application made to it, and by this Court
on appeal from its order, yet judicial propriety is best consulted by ac-
cepting the judgment of the State court upon the points involved in that
inquiry. That, however, does not preclude this Court from putting upon
the ordinances of the supervisors of the County and City of San Fran-
cisco, an independent construction; for the determination of the ques-
tion whether the proceedings under these ordinances, and in the en-
forcement of them, are in conflict with the Constitution and laws of the
United States, necessarily involves the meaning of the ordinances, which,
for that purpose, -we are required to ascertain and judge. We are con-
sequently constrained, at the outset, to differ from the Supreme Court
of California, upon the real meaning of the ordinances in question:
MATTHEWS, J., Yick WVo v. Hopkins, Sheriff and IVo Lee v. Same (1886),
I18 U. S. 356, 36+-6.
That is, the Supreme Court of the United States is the in-
terpreter of the Constitution, and: in performing this duty is
not hampered byState constructions of State laws: else the
declared supremacy of the Constitution might be more
threatening than real: (See above, page 425). For this rea-
son Yick Wo v. Hofikins, as well as Henderson v. The
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-Aayor ; W~allizg v. M7ficligalz (s?'Pra, pages 465, 738), and
.R. Co. v. Husen (in fra, page 80) were cited upon the
paramount authority of the Constitution of the United
States, over the police power of the States, by Justice -IAR-
LAN, iii Auglerv. Kansas (1887) 123 U. S. 623, 663.
This case of JMacinie Co. v. Gage, did not receive much
recog-nition, before the dissenting opinion of Justice GRAY
(ante, page 536): for in Walling v. zMickigan (I886), 116 U.
S. 446, 461, Justice BRADLEY merely mentioned it as not
sustaining an occupation tax so specialized as to discriminate
against the products of another State; and after citing the
latter case, Justice BLATCHFORD, in Pickard v. Pullman S.
Car Co. (1886), 117 U. S. 34, 49, referred to Mfachme Co. v
Gage, with some others, as containing a collection of cases
on the indication of Congressional pleasure from non-action,
that interstate commerce should be free from State interfer-
ence. Finally, in Robbz'ns v. Taxizg Distrct (1887), 120
U. S. 489, 497, Justice BRADLEY delivering the majority
opinion, in which a drummer's tax was aeclared invalid (infra,
page 758), pointed out the controlling fact of the machines,
though manufactured in another State, having been received
at the office in Nashville and from thence peddled; that is,
the arrival of the goods in the State placed them within its
taxing power ( sira, page 727), though the laying of a tax
on a peddler, because the goods were made in another State,
.would transgress the Constitution freedom of trade, where the
peddler had arrived from another State (infra, page 759), or
while the goods remained in the Constitutional condition of
an original package (szqfra, pages 721, 728, 459, 491)
In Vebber v. Slate of Virgina (1881), 13 Otto (103 U. S.)
344, the plaintiff had been indicted in the County Court of
Henrico, May 12, 188o, for selling Singer sewing machines,
which had been manufactured in New York State, without
having paid a tax required by, and not being excepted
from, the Virginia Act of March 27, 1876, which provided.
that-
45. Any prcrson who shall sell or offer for sale, tie manifactured articles
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or machines of other Slates or Territories, unless he be the owner thereof,
andlaxed as a merchant, or take orders therefor, on commission, or other-
wise, shall be deemed to be an agentfor thesale of mnanufactured articles
of olher States or Territories, and shall not act as such without takinig out
a license therefor. No such person shall, under his license as such, sell or
offer to sell such articles, through the agency of another; but a separate
license shall be required from any agent, or employee, who may sell, or
offer to sell, such articles for another. For any violation of this section,
the person offending shall pay a fine of not less than fifty dollars, nor more
than one hundred dollars, for each offence: (Laws of 1875-6, pages 184, 85).
46. The specific license tax upon an agent, for the sale of any manufac-
tured article or machine of other States or Territories, shall be twenty-five
dollars; and this tax shall give to any party, licensed under this section,
the right to sell the same within the county or corporation in which he
shall take out his license; and if he shall sell, or offer to sell the same in
any other of the counties or corporations of this State, he shall pay an
additional tax of ten dollars in each of the counties or corporations where
he may sell or offer to sell the same. Alt Persons, other than resident
manufaclurers, or their agents, selling articles man z/actured in this Stale,
shall pay thespecific license tax imposed by this section: (Id).
So far as the Singer machine was a patented article, all
the courts followed Patterson v. K entucky,; szpra, page 742.
Upon the question of discrimination between manufac-
turers in the State and those of other States, the County
Judge, B. R. WELLFORD, read the two sections together,
omitting the words in roman, and concluded that the pur-
pose of the statute was to impose the tax upon the person,
and not on the goods; hence the act was constitutional, fol-
lowing Hinson v. Lott, stipra, page 735.
Under these rulings, Webber was convicted in the County
Court, and this judgment was affirmed in the State Supreme
Court of Appeals, upon the same grounds, in an opinion by
Judge STAPLES: 33 Grat. (Va.) 898. The judgment was
then removed to the Supreme Court of the United States
and there reversed upon the ground of discrimination. ap-
* parent from reading the two sections together, as the Vir-
Sginia Court did, with the opposite result
By these Sections, read together, we have this result: the agent for the
sale of articles manufactured in other States must first obtain a license to
sell, for which he is required to pay a specific tax for each county in which
he sells, or offers to sell them; while the agent for the sale of articles
manufactured in the State, if acting for the manufacturer, is not required
to obtain a license or pay any license tax. Here there is a clear discrimi-
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nation in favor of home manufacturers and against the manufacturers of
other States. Sales by manufacturers are chiefly effected through agents.
A tax upon their agents, when thus engaged, is therefore a tax upon
them, and if this is made to depend upon the foreign character of the
articles, that is, upon their having been manufactured without the State,
it is, to that extent, a regulation of commerce in the articles, between
the States. -It matters not whether the tax be laid directly upon the
articles sold, or in the form of licenses for their sale. If by reason of their
foreign character, the State can impose a tax upon them, or upon the
persons through whom the sales are effected, the amount of the tax will
be a matter resting in her discretion. She may place the tax at so high a
figure as to exclude the introduction of the foreign article, and prevent
competition with the home product. It was against' legislation of this
discriminating kind that the framers of the Constitution intended to
guard, when they vested in Congress the power to regulate commerce
among the several States: tIErLD, J., Webbier v. Va. (1881), 13 Otto
(103 U. S.) 344, 350.
This was precisely the position of the Court in Brown v.
Maryland, in response to the sentiment that there should be
confidence in the State governments: (- ra, pages 440-I):
and it was fortified by a reference to and affirmance of
Welton v. MWissouri, supra, page 751.
Robbins v. The Taxing District (1887), 120 U. S. 489,
began February 4, 1884, by the arrest of Sabine Robbins
for doing business as drummer without license, in Memphis,
Tennessee, then officially known as The Taxing District of
Shelby County. Robbins was selling paper and stationery
for Rose, Robbins & Co., of Cincinnati, Ohio, without
complying with the 'State Act approved April 4, 1881,
which amended a prior act to establish taxing districts, and
especially-
SEc. 16. Be itfurther enacted, That subsection fifty (50) mentioned in
the caption of this' Act, be amended to read as follows: All drummers
and all persons not having a regular licensed house of business in the
Taxing District, offering for sale or selling goods, wares or merchandise
therein by sample, shall be required to pay to the County Trustee, the,
sum of ten dollars per week, or twenty-five dollars per month, for such
privilege, and no license shall be issued for a longer period than three
months: (Laws, page 114).
Robbins was convicted in the State Courts, and this judg-
ment was affirmed in the State Supreme Court, on a unani-
mous opinion by COOPER, J., pointing out the policy of the
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State to make the pursuit of numerous enumerated forms of
business, a privilege to be paid for by all persons without
discrimination, and supposing that the Constitutional right
to require a license was well settled, especially as to the Na-
tional Constitution, by Osborne v. Jfobile (1873), 16 WalL
(83 U. S.) 479, a case of taxation of the agent of the South-
ern Express Company. Robbins v. Taxing District (1884),
13 Lea. (Tenn.) 303, 3io. This judgment was then removed
to the Supreme Court of the United States, and there re-
versed, March 7, 1887, upon an opinion by Justice BRAD-
LEY, with the concurrence of Justices MILLER, HARLAN,,
MATTHiEWS and BLATCHFORD (120 U. S. 489).
A dissenting opinion was read by Chief justice WAITE,.
for himself and Justices FIELD and GRAY, in which the
chief reliance was placed, as by the State Court, upon Os-
borne v. J71obile, just mentioned, where the opinion was de-
livered by Chief Justice CHASE, with the assent of Justices
CLIFFORD, SWAYNE, MILLER, DAVID DAVIS, FIELD, BRAD-
LEY, STRONG and HuNT. But this case is now of little value
since the decision in Lelozip v. iliobile (1888), 127 U. S.
640, where Justice BRADLEY delivered the unanimous opin-
ion, denying the right of a State to require a telegraph com-
pany to pay a license fee for the transaction of interstate
business.
This dissenting opinion in Robbins v. Taxing District,
expressly disclaimed the consideration of a tax upon a drum-
mer without samples; but this is now a matter of no im-
portance, since the unanimous judgment of the Supreme
Court of the United States in Asher v. Texas (1888), 128,
U. S. 129, on an opinion also by Justice BRADLE,'affirming-
Robbins v. Taxing District, and declaring unconstitutional
the Texas Act of May 4, 1882, amending the Revised Sta-
tutes of 1881, so as to read:-
ARTiCL, 4665. That there shall be levied Qn and collected from every
person, firm, company or associftion of persons pursuing any of the fol-
lowing named occupations, an annual tax, except when herein otherwise
provided, on every such occupation or separate establishment, as follows:
S . "* from every commercial traveler, drummer, salesman, or-
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solicitor of trade, by sample or otherwise, an annual occupation tax of
'thirty-five dollars, payable in advance ;" " and every commercial
traveler, drummer, salesman, or solicitor of trade who shall fail, or re-
fuse to exhibit said receipt to such officer on demand by him, shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and fined, in a sum notlessthan twenty-
five, nor more than one hundred dollars: (Laws, pages iS and 19).
While this act covered those within the exception of
WAITE'S dissenting opinion, Asher was in fact selling rub-
ber stamps, and the opinion in his case, was an unqualified
and unanimous assent to Robbins v. Taxing District. The
opinion of the Court of Appeals of Texas undoubtedly forced
the Supreme Court of the United States to the full extent of
their previous position, for the Texas Judge (WHITE) said:
But such decisions, no more than the decisions of the State courts, are
or should be binding upon the latter, if in themselves unwarranted as-
sumptions of Constitutional authority-invocations of the Federal power,
when such power does not and was never intended to apply -nd operate;
and, moreover, when said decisions are directly in conflict with well ad-
judicated cases of the same Court, which are not overruled, and which,
in addition to their equal authority, are based upon fundamental and
eternal principles of reason, justice and right: Ex parte Asher (1887), 23
Texas Ap. 662, 667; S. c. 27 AmER. L.Aw REGISTiER, 77, 79-80.
Divested of its rhetoric, it willbe observed that this Texas
decision was founded upon the rule of uniformity declaredin
Moodruff v. Parhzam, and H-insoz v. Lott (sitjra, pages 728,
735), and upon the exception recognized in Osborne v. Mo-
hile (1873), 16 Wall. (83 U. S.) 479, and the case of the State
Tax on Railway Gross Receipts (1873), 15 Wall. (82 U. S.)
284, where the power of a State to tax persons and property
within its limits was declared not to be restrained by the
mere fact that interstate commerce would be more expensively
conducted; hence Osborne, an express agent, was required
to obtain a license, and the Philadelphia and Reading Rail-
road Company was required to pay a tax to the State which
chartered it, upon its gross receipts, including those from
interstate commerce.
These two last cases are directly in point. They were decided by a
-unanimous Court. They are not overruled in Robbins v. Taxing District,
relied upon by the applicant in this case. They are directly in conflict
-with the Robbins case; and the Robbins case is simply the opinion of a
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majority, and not of the whole Court. WAITE, C. J., in, to our minds, an
unanswerable opinion, concurred in by those profound and eminent jur-
ists, FIELD and GRAY, dissented from the doctrine announced. Under
such circumstances, we do not feel bound by the Robbins decision, and not
believing it to be the law of the land, we will not consider it as of binding
force upon us: WHIRE, P. J., Exparte Asher, 23 Texas App. 674; 27
A-MER. LAWv REGISTER, 86-7.
It has already appeared that Osborne v. Mobile, isno longer
a valid precedent (szra, page 759), and it may now be ob-
served that the exception recognized in the case of the State
Tax on Railway Gross Receipts (vide, page 760, sitfra), has
been denied as to the business of carrying on interstate com-
merce by Justice BRADLEY in Pizila. & S. S. Co. v. Pa.
(1887), 122 U. S. 326, 342, and in Le2oup v. Mobile (1888),
127 Id. 640, 646, where he said-
A great numberand variety of cases, involving the commercial power of
Congress, have been broughtto the attention of this Court within the past
fifteen years, which have frequently made it necessary to re-examine the
whole subject with care; and the result has sometimes been, that in order
to give full and fair effect to the different clauses of the Constitution, the
Court has felt constrained to recur to the fundamental principles stated
and illustrated with so much clearness and force by Chief Justice MAR-
SHALl, and other members of the Court in former times, and to modify in
some degree certain dicta and decisions that have occasionally been made
in the intervening period. This is always done, however, with great
caution, and an anxious desire to place the final conclusion reached, upon
the fairest and most just construction of the Constitution in all its parts.
In our opinion, such a construction of the Constitution leads to the con-
,clusion that no State has the right to lay a tax on interstate commerce in
any form, whether by way of duties laid on the transportation of the sub-
jedts of that commerce, or on the receipts derivedfrom that transportation,
or on the occupation or business of carrying it on, and the reason is that
such taxation is a burden on that commerce, and amounts to a regulation
of it, which belongs solely to Congress: BRADLEY, J., Leloup v. -obile
(1888), 127 U. S. 640, 648.
To this statement of the prevailing principle of construc-
tion is appended areference to the Case of State Freight Tax
(873), 15 Wall..(82 U.S.) 232; Pensacola Tel. Co. v. T U.
Tel Co. (1878), 96 U. S. I ; MAfobile v. Kimball (I88I), "io2
Id. 691; TV U. Tel. Co. v. Texas (1882), 1O5 Id. 46o;
Moran v. X. 0. (1884), 112 Id. 69 ; Gloucester F. Co. v.
Pa. (1885), 114 Id. 196; Brown v. Houston, szra, page 732;
Walling v. Afichi-an, szqfra, 738; Picard v. P. S. C. Co.
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(1886), 117 Id. S. 34; MVaba s R.R. Co. v. Ill. (1886), 113
Id. 557; Robbins v. Taxing Dist. szqfra, page 758; P.ila.
& S. S. Co. v. Pa. (1887), 122 U. S. 326; TV U. Tel. Co.
v. Pendlelon (1887), Id. 347; Rallerman v. TV U. Tel. Co.
(i888), 127 Id. 411. To these may be added TV. U. Tel. Co.
v. Alabama (1889), 132 U. S. 472, 477; Bowman v. Chicago
& N. W PR. Co. (1888), 125 Id. 465, 497; Fargo v.
Sevens (1887), 121 Id. 230, 246; Corson v. AMd. sufira, page
750; and Lyzg v. Mich., sufira, page 739, and the emphatic
language of Justice BRADLEY, when writing the unanimous
opinion of the Court in Asher v. Texas.
Turning to the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice WAITE,
so highly praised in Texas but no longer law in any part
of the Union, the principal foundation for it appears to
be a supposed preference of strangers over citizens, largely
based upon confusion of the two different methods of sale,
by sample and by carrying and delivering the goods. Upon
this confusion of thought, a portion of the majority opinion
should be read :-
Many manufacturers do open houses or places of business in other
States than those in which they reside, and send their goods there to be
kept for sale. But this is a matter of convenience, and not of compulsion,
and would neither suit the convenience nor be within the ability of many
others engaged in the same kinds of business, and would be entirely un-
suited to many branches of business. In these cases, then, what shall
the merchant or manufacturer do who wishes to sell his goods in other
States? Must he sit still in his factory or warehouse and wait for the peo-
ple of those States to come to him? This would be a silly and ruinous
proceeding. * * * The truth is, that in numberless instances, the
most feasible, if not the only practicable way for the merchant or manu-
facturer to obtain orders in other States, is to obtain them by personal
application, either by himself or by some one employed by him for that
purpose; and in many branches of business, lie must necessarily exhibit
samples for the purpose of determining the kind and quality of the goods
he proposes to sell, or which the other party desires to purchase. * * * *
But it will be said that a denial of this power of taxation will interfere
with the right of the State to tax business pursuits and callings carried on
within its limits. * : * * It will only prevent the levy of a tax, or the
requirement of a license, for making negotiations in the conduct of inter-
state commerce; and it may well be asked where the State gets authority
for imposing burdens on that branch of business any more than for im-
posing a tax on the business of importing from foreign countries, or even
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on that of postmaster or United States Marshal. * If the selling of
goods by sample, and the employment of drummers for that purpose, in-
juriously affect the local interest of the States, Congress, if applied to,
will undoubtedly make such reasonable regulations as the case may de-
mand. And Congress alone can do it: for it is obvious that such regula-
tions should be based on a uniform system, applicable to the whole
country, and not left to the varied, discordant, or retaliatory enactments of
forty different States: BRADLI E, J., Robbins v. Taxing Disrict (1887),
120 U. S. 489, 495-8. 4
The latest of the decisions giving freedom to drummers,
is Stoutenburg v. Hennick (I889), 129 U. S. 141, which be-
gan by the arrest of William J. Hennick in Washington
City, D. C., for acting as commercial agent of a Baltimore
wholesale house, without having paid the license fee required
by the District Act of August 23, 1871, Section 21 :-
Third, Commercial agents shall pay two hundred and fifty dollars.
Every person residing in the District of Columbia, whose business it is,
as agents for nonresident manufacturers or wholesale dealers, to offer for
sale merchandise, shall be regarded as a commercial agent: (Acts, Sess.
I, page 93)-
Hennick was convicted, but only to be released upon
Habeas Corfins by the District Supreme Court, May 9, 1887,
because the Act was an unauthorized regulation of inter-
state commerce and obnoxious to the principle of the R6b-
bins Case (supra, page 758). The discussion of the princi-
ples by which the decision was to be reached, extended also,
to the power of Congress over the District, but no final con-
clusion was reached as the case required nothing more than
the determination that the local government erected by Con-
gress, was municipal and not competent to exercise any
larger powers: Re Hennick (1887), 5 Mackey 489. The
case was then removed to the Supreme Court of the United
States where the release of Hennick was affirmed, January
14, 1889, on an opinion by Chief Justice FULLER, on the
ground taken in the Robbins Case, that such business re-
quired uniform regulation, and not Congressional action,
directly or indirectly for the District alone. Justice MILLER
dissented because the District of Columbia was not a State,
a ground which is much too narrow, as was pointed out in
the Court below
THE LAW GOVERNING
This District is set aside and dedicated to the uses of the Nation, and if
-there be anywhere on the face of the earth, alocality where no discrimina-
tion should be made as against the rights of any of the States, or any
citizens of the United States, it should be upon this soil where all are
equal, on which each citizen has an equal right and in. which each State
has an equal right, as regards all the other States, and as regards the
United States itself. " We cannot suppose that when the Con-
gress vested with power to legislate over this District, it was clothed
with any power to act as such Legislature, in hostility to the rights of the
States, or to do anything regarding the interests of the citizens of one
State, which any State of the Union could not do with regard to the citi-
zens of any other State: MERRIcK, J., Re Hennick, 5 Mackey 489.
These sentiments are very similar to the principle ex-
pressed by Justice MILLER, in Crandall v. Nevada (slifira,
page 464), when denying the validity of a tax upon each
passenger leaving the State, as against the authority of Jvc-
Cullock v. Maryland (1819) 4 Wheat. (17 U. S.) 316.
The people of the United States constitute one nation. They have a
government in which all of them are deeply interested. This government
has necessarily a capital establishel by law, where its principal operations
.are conducted. " That government has a right to call to this
point, any or all of its citizens, to aid in its service, as members of the
Congress, of the Courts, of the Executive Departments, and to fill all its
other offices; and this right cannot be made to dependupon the pleasure
of a State over whose territory they must pass to reach the point where
these services must be rendered. :' " But if the government has
these rights on her own account, the citizen also has correlative rights.
He has the right to come to the seat of government to assert any claim he
may have upon that government, or to transact any business he may have
with it: MIILUI, J., Crandall v. IVevada (1867), 6 Wall. (73 U. S.) 35,
43-4-
The final result of these progressive decisions is an affirm-
ance of Robbins v. Taxing District, Leloup v. Mfobile, Asher
v. Texas, Stmtenburg v. Hennick, and Lyng v. Mvicligan
(herein, pages 758, 759, 760, 763, 739, s1Ipra), in the case of
fcCall v. California (I89O), 136 U. S. 104. This latest
case began by the conviction of J. G. McCall, in the police
-court of the City and County of San Francisco, June 3,
1888, for soliciting passenger traffic in that City, for the
Erie Railway, extending between Chicago and New York
-City, -without having paid the quarterly fee required of "every
-railroad agency," by a municipal regulation (Order No.
1589 of the Board of Supervisors of the City and County of
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San Francisco). Upon appeal to the Superior Court of that
City, the judgment was affirmed, but upon removal to the
Supreme Court of the United States, it was reversed, as the
order imposed a tax on interstate commerce.
This effect of the order was denied by the California Court,
on the ground that the business of soliciting passengers in
California for a railroad wholly outside of that State, did not
result in the introduction of anything into the State, and
hence could not be an instrument of interstate commerce.
The argument is based upon the assumption that the provision in the
Constitution of the United States relating to commerce among the States,
applies as a limitation of power, only to those States, through which such
commerce would pass, and that any other State can impose any tax it
may deem proper upon such commerce. To state such a proposition is ta-
refute it; for if the clause in question prohibits a State from taxing inter-
state commerce as it passes through its own territory, a fortiori the pro-
hibition will extend to such commerce when it does not pass through its
territory. * * * It is further said that the soliciting of passengers,
in California, for a railroad running from Chicago to New York, if con-
nected with interstate commerce at all, is so very remotely connected
with it that the hindrance to the business of the plaintiff in error caused
by the tax, could not directly affect the commerce of the road, because his.
business was not essential. The reply to this proposition is that the es-
sentiality of the business of the plaintiff in error to the commerce of the
road he represented, is not the test as to whether that business was a part
of interstate commerce. * * * The test is-Was this business a part
of the commerce of the road? Did it assist, or was it carriea on with the
purpose to assist in increasing the amount of passenger traffic on the
road? If it did, the power to tax it involves, the lessening of the com-
merce of the road, to an extent commensurate with the amount ofbusiness.
doneby theagent: LAMARJ., McCallv. Cal. (i89o), 136 U.S. IO4, ino-ii.
It seems advisable to add once more, that the subject of
State and Congressional regulation of the instruments of
commerce cannot be entered into, for want of space: the
references already made to such cases as have reached the
Supreme Court of the United States, are sufficient to show
that the same general principles are there applied.
JOHN B. UHLE.
(To be concluded in the December number.)
